Today even the smallest organization depends heavily on information systems (IS) to support achievement of its objectives. Thus there exists a need for tools and techniques for choosing controls, or IS components that assure system dependability. Several researchers have developed quantitative models of controls. One such model for choosing controls incorporated the trade-off between the cost of establishing controls and the cost of not having them. The model was a refinement of the "control evaluation table" method used by auditors, enhanced with a probability model of control effectiveness, and formulated as a 0-1 nonlinear optimization problem. This paper presents a brief review of the model formulation and then goes on to provide a spreadsheet model solution.
INTRODUCTION
Controls are procedures built into an information system (IS) for the purpose of increasing its dependability. Decisions about what controls to incorporate into an IS are usually made during the design of the system. Walls (1992) formulated a 0-1 nonlinear optimization model for selecting the "right" set of controls for an IS (from a cost-benefit point of view). He found that to determine an optimal solution for the model required the use of a relatively obscure software package (MINOS) and nearly an hours worth of mainframe computing time. To avoid these issues, Walls and Turban (1992) implemented heuristics for finding good solutions in the form of logic programs in the Prolog programming language.
Today's powerful personal computers and sophisticated spreadsheet software provide tools for finding an optimal solution to the control selection problem that are readily available to everyone. This paper describes the use of a straightforward Microsoft Excel spreadsheet model that employs the Solver© add-in to select a set of IS controls.
CONTROL SELECTION MODEL
Walls (1992) formulated a control selection model that was a refinement and extension of the control evaluation table method used by auditors to evaluate the collection of internal controls found in an IS. The auditors' method involved the use of a set of matrices containing a list of possible controls, the hazards each counteracted, and subjective assessments of the effectiveness of each control in counteracting each hazard.
An example of a control is the use of a user name/password procedure to restrict access to information contained in an IS. Theft of confidential company data is an example of a hazard.
The control selection model takes into account the tradeoff between the cost of including each control in the IS and the expected value of the financial impact of the hazards to which the system is exposed. The equation below reflects the total cost, TC, of a set of controls incorporated into an IS:
In this equation, X i is a control, C(X i ) is the cost of control X i , Z j is a hazard, R(Z j ) is the economic risk associated with hazard Z j , and E(X i ,Z j ) is the effectiveness of control X i in counteracting risk Z j . As may be seen from the above equation, adding controls to an IS increases total control cost (TCC) and decreases total residual risk (TRR). Eventually, a point may be reached where the cost of adding control exceeds the savings due to risk reduction associated with including it. Derivation of this equation as well as a discussion of other analytical models proposed for selecting and evaluating controls may be found in Walls (1992) . (Ideas underlying the equation are also summarized in the Appendix.)
To determine the best level of control, the above equation may be reformulated as an optimization problem. For any particular IS, there are many controls that could be 
Note that in this formulation there is an important trade-off between control cost and effectiveness. At one extreme, if all controls are implemented ( 1 = i X for all i), the total control cost will assume its maximum value and uncontrolled risk its minimum value. At the other extreme, of no controls are implemented ( 0 = i X for all i) then the cost of using controls will be at its lowest level but the risk level will be at its maximum.
Therefore, solving the above equation finds an appropriate balance between control cost and the level of risk. This is done by using a common denominator (money) to relate control cost and risk. Walls (1992) reported that finding an optimal solution to a design problem of realistic size took over forty three minutes of processor time running the MINOS nonlinear optimization package on an Amdahl mainframe. Today with powerful microprocessors and the Solver© add-in, solution times are dramatically reduced.
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A COMPUTATIONAL EXAMPLE
This section presents a small example with five hazards, three consequences, and nine controls that illustrates the application of the model. The example is taken from a customer order processing system. Figure 1 is a spreadsheet that lays out the details of the example. In this example, hazards listed in Table 1 were identified. Hazard opportunities and likelihoods for each were then identified and entered into the spreadsheet. For example, the likelihood of "Inaccurate payment input" is 0.025 (cell E6) and the opportunity for the hazard is 1,000 (cell E7) times per time period. The consequences listed below were also identified. One consequence of "Inaccurate payment input" is "Customer never billed". As may be seen in the spreadsheet, the likelihood of this consequence is 0.99 (cell E9) and, if it were to occur, the loss would be $20 (cell C9). could be formulated as an optimization model that attempted to find an optimal solution to a problem of ongoing importance. Because the computational effort involved in solving this model can be very high due to the combinatorial nature of the model, earlier research resulted in heuristics that could considerably reduce this effort. In this paper, the problem is formulated in such a way that an optimal solution can be determined using spreadsheet software.
A numerical example was presented that includes five risks and nine controls. In a realistic situation there will be many more risks and controls. Since the model assumes hazards and controls are given in lists, there is no theoretical limit to the size of the problem that could be solved using this approach. All one needs to do is add rows and columns to the spreadsheet corresponding to controls and hazards and data about loss, effectiveness, and cost. There is a practical upper limit to problem size, however, because there is an upper limit to the number of variables and constraints that Solver© can accommodate in Excel.
To simplify the model, all data was included in the cells of the spreadsheet. The model could be enhanced to obtain data interactively from the user. Another possible extension would be to provide the user with tools such as the Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1988) which can facilitate estimating risk levels and placing a monetary value on residual risk. The user could also be permitted to review and/or override effectiveness measures. Although the values used for costs and effectiveness measures in the example are arbitrary, expert opinions could be incorporated into the model.
Although the intent of the model is to aid in the design of new IS, it could be modified to be used by auditors to evaluate controls in an existing system. Application to an existing system would also allow one to fine tune it to make it more cost effective.
The model can also be easily adopted to non-computerized systems. After all, not all information systems are computer-based. Such systems also have a need for cost- 
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In summary, the chief advantage of using a spreadsheet package to find an optimal solution to the problem of selecting IS controls is that such tools are widely available today and very familiar to business professionals. Furthermore, the approach presented here can be implemented very quickly in any internal control system, assuming the availability of the necessary parameters. One need only substitute in the existing parameters characterizing the situation to be modeled. The uncontrolled risk, R, for a hazard Z j is the expected monetary loss associated with the occurrence of Z j if no controls are in place. It is calculated using the parameters of hazards and consequences: Z . This probability is designated as:
To understand the mathematics of combining controls, we will examine the interaction of two preventive controls that counteract the same hazard (Cushing, 1974) . 
succeeds, or k X succeeds, or both succeed )
The hazard will not be counteracted if both controls fail:
fails and k X fails ).
Net effectiveness (NE) is the combined effectiveness of all controls which counteract a hazard. This, the net effectiveness of a pair of controls i X and k X , for a hazard j Z , can be defined as:
Generalizing to a set of s controls that counteract the same hazard, j Z , this analysis can be extended to yield:
This model assumes the independence of the effectiveness of different controls.
Practically speaking, this means that failure of one control to counteract a hazard is associated with neither an increase nor a decrease in the likelihood that a second control will counteract the hazard. This assumption is valid in most cases. For example, if both password identification and encryption are being used to prevent unauthorized access to data, the fact that a perpetrator has obtained a password does not necessarily mean that he can decrypt the data. The fact that a limit check on a value has failed does not imply that a control total will also fail. Sometimes, however, failure of one control can be related to (2) and (4), to be:
Other controls can be added in a similar manner.
While the complexity of expression (4) grows rapidly as the number of controls increases, it is still feasible to define and evaluate such an expression, given a particular hazard and a single set of controls. The control selection problem addressed in this paper, however, is actually more complex. Given a particular hazard, and N potential controls to counteract it, then there exist 2 N possible combinations of controls, each of which yields the complex evaluation expression (4). The computations required to select the best combination of controls for a single hazard grows exponentially with the number of controls. Therefore, the selection of the optimal set of controls for a given set of hazards for problems of real world size is computationally complex and costly.
Equation (1) is multiplicative in (1-E). Similarly, Eq. (3) is multiplicative in E. Equation (4), however, is more complex than either (1) or (3). A simplifying assumption, that at least one corrective control is always used whenever a detective control is applied, allows Eq. (4) to be expressed in the form of Eq. (1). Since it makes little sense to spend money to detect a hazard if nothing is going to be done to correct it (once it has been detected), then the above simplifying assumption is basically realistic. A possible drawback of this simplification is that there may be more than one possible corrective control that may be chosen to be combined with a detective control. When this case arises, each corrective control can be combined with the detective control to form a combination that becomes one of the alternatives to be evaluated. This assumption allows a detective-corrective control combination to be considered as a single unit that behaves mathematically like a preventive control in Eq. (1).
Transforming the problem from Eq. (4) Note that the independence of hazard occurrence and control effectiveness mentioned earlier is implicit in Equation (7). 
In Eq. (9), DQ = 1 when total residual risk, TRR, is 0. This case would arise when a set of controls counteracted all hazards, making the IS completely dependable.
Conversely, DQ = 0 implies that the total uncontrolled risk, TUR, is equal to TRR. This case would arise when no hazards were counteracted. Since most IS would include one or more controls but would not counteract all hazards, DQ would normally be greater than zero but less than one. The more dependable a system, the closer its dependability quotient is to one.
The total cost, TC, of the control system for an IS is then:
]. 
